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Reviews
A THEORY OF JUSTICE. By John Rawls. Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press, 1971. Pp. xv, 607.
In A Theory of Justice John Rawls constructs a comprehensive
social contract theory of justice to stand as a substantive
alternative to utilitarianism. This work combines and develops
the ideas of earlier essays, such as "Justice as Fairness" (1958),
"The Sense of Justice" (1963), "Constitutional Liberty" (1963)
and "Civil Disobedience" (1966), into a systematic moral and
political philosophy of astonishing power and subtlety. I shall
sketch its main principles, their derivation and justification, and
then raise some questions about the supposed opposition
between the standards of justice and utility.*
I
The guiding idea is that the principles of justice governing the
institutions and social arrangements of society should be
"principles that free and rational persons concerned to further
their own interests would accept in an initial position of
equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association"
(1 1). Rawls calls this justice as fairness. The original position of
equality is a hypothetical situation, not the state of nature in
traditional theory of social contract. To guarantee equality in
this situation, the principles are chosen behind a veil of
ignorance: no one knows his place in society or his natural
assets, such as intelligence or health; nor does anyone know his
own conception of the good or his special psychological
propensities. The parties to the agreement understand, however,
that whatever their various conceptions of the good, each will
be better able to realise his ends and ideals the greater his share
of the social primary goods, such as income and wealth, power
and authority. They understand also that they will live together
in circumstances that will make human cooperation both
*Parenthetical page references are to the text.
tThis a conceptual point which I argue in "The Pursuit of Happiness"
(forthcoming in The Personalist).
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possible and necessary. Rawls calls the latter the circumstances
of justice. Finally, they accept certain formal constraints: the
principles chosen must be formulated without reference to
particular individuals, designed to hold for everyone (not
merely restricted classes of individuals), adopted on the
assumption that everyone knows that everyone accepts the
principles, recognized as capable of ordering (with transitivity)
all conflicting claims likely to arise in practice, and understood
to take precedence over all other principles in practical
reasoning. Being rational (in a morally neutral sense familiar in
social theory) and aware of the circumstances of justice, the
parties in the original position can agree only to principles that
define a cooperative scheme that best serves to maximize their
individual shares of the primary goods. Yet subject to the veil of
ignorance and the formal constraints, they can agree only to
principles that respect the interests of everyone and give no
person an unfair advantage in pursuing his own ends.
It is assumed that the original parties know the general
facts about human society. For example, they understand
(within limits) the principles of economic theory, the laws of
human psychology, and the basis of social organization. Even
so, not knowing the likelihoods of the sets of circumstances in
which they might find themselves, they cannot base their choice
of principles on the mathematical expectation of gain in
primary goods. Furthermore, in the original position it is not
rational for anyone to gamble on a principle for the sake of a
special advantage, since the potential losses are great. For these
reasons Rawls argues that a conservative strategy of decision
would be adopted in the choice of principles to minimize
potential losses (on analogy with the "maximin" rule of game
theory). The two chief principles of justice thus selected are:
First Principle (of Equal Liberty) - Each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
like liberty for others. Second Principle - Social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity. Part (a) is called the Difference
Principle and (b) the Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity.
Much is packed into these principles. Among the basic
liberties are the right to vote and to be eligible for public office,
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freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and
freedom of thought, freedom of the person, and the right to
hold property. The Equal Liberty Principle allows these liberties
to be restricted in certain cases provided that a less extensive
liberty strengthens the total system of shared liberty or a less
than equal liberty is acceptable to those with lesser liberty. This
principle is "lexically" prior to the second in the sense that it
must be satisfied before the other is applied. Hence, lesser
liberties cannot be traded for greater social and economic
benefits. Once the Equal Liberty Principle is satisfied, the
Second Principle allows inequalities, measured by the distribu-
tion of primary goods other than liberties, provided that (a) a
representative person from the least advantaged sector of
society is better off than he would be if these inequalities did
not exist and provided that (b) offices and positions are open to
all in more than a merely formal sense. Within this principle
part (b) is lexically prior to (a). Fair equality of opportunity
requires that everyone should have a fair chance to attain
offices and positions irrespective of the income class into which
they are born. This requires, in turn, equal opportunities of
education and other favourable social conditions on which
depend the development of natural capacities and even the
willingness to make an effort (74). Inequality of opportunity is
permissible only when it increases the opportunities of those
who otherwise, due to natural circumstances, would have lesser
opportunities.
The Difference Principle may appear somewhat para-
doxical. How can an inequality in the distribution of primary
goods benefit the least advantaged? The assumption is that
some inequality is ineluctable. Men are born with different
natural capacities into different social positions and con-
sequently some will stand a better chance than others to realise
their conceptions of a good life. This is a natural fact which is
neither just nor unjust. But the distribution of social primary
goods, such as income, wealth, power, and authority, can be
controlled to some extent, and according to Rawls an unequal
distribution of these goods may be more just than an equal
distribution. For an unequal distribution, say, where a doctor is
given special training and privileges, may improve the lives of
those who have fared worst in the natural and social "lottery".
Such inequalities are justified by the Difference Principle not
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because some men "merit" more of the social primary goods
than others or because the total (or average share) of such goods
would in the end be greater; but only because the least
advantaged would benefit.
These complex principles, subject to further qualifications,
are used in the derivation of other principles, notably principles
of natural duty and a principle of fairness. Their implications
for institutions in a democratic society and for the issue of civil
disobedience and conscientious refusal are elaborated at length.
The principles are justified in part by these implications.
II
What arguments can be advanced to support this conception of
justice and on what grounds can its principles be justified? It is
no surprise that the justifying grounds are at least as complex as
the derivation of the principles. For Rawls takes the derivation
of the principles to be part of their justification. Derived as they
are from a hypothetical agreement among equals concerned to
further their own ends, the principles should be to the
advantage of everyone but partial to none. This ideal appears to
capture the essence of our intuitive understanding of justice and
seems bound to be reflected in the two main principles just in
virtue of their method of derivation. The derivation might be
regarded, then, as an extended elaboration and analysis of our
most basic intuitive understanding of justice.
It would be a serious mistake, however, to take justice as
fairness to be merely an explication of a concept of justice
devoid of any substantive moral judgments. Much less is it an
account of how terms like "just" and "fair" are used in
ordinary language. The theory of justice as fairness, in the first
place, derives the main principles of justice not from definitions
of concepts or appeal to usage, but rather from reflection on
the kind of social contract that would be accepted in the
original position. Secondly, the theory appeals throughout to
empirical principles in moral psychology and political economy.
In contrast to contemporary "meta-ethical" theories, justice as
fairness is, in this respect, in the tradition of Bentham, John
Stuart Mill, and Hume. The aim is not to formulate a priori
principles that hold in all logically possible words - as in the
ethics of creation (159) - for such principles, even if they could
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be comprehended, would be too weak to provide an adequate
account of justice for this world.
The principles of justice cannot, of course, be deduced
from empirical facts. Appeal to such facts is made instead to
draw out the implications of the principles of justice as they
apply to political and social institutions generally and to special
circumstances. In this way the content of the principles is
clarified and their implications tested against the considered
moral judgments we are inclined to make at various levels of
generality. What is desired, in Rawls' view, is a fit between these
reflective moral judgments and the first principles derived from
a conception of justice. When the fit is not perfect, we may
modify our considered judgments to bring them in line with the
first principles - or we may qualify these principles to make
them accord with our present convictions. If these principles are
modified, there obviously will be further implications which
may or may not match our considered judgments. This process
of self-examination is said to reach a state of reflective
equilibrium when, after considering every alternative concep-
tion of justice and all relevant philosophical arguments, we
arrive at a conception whose implications are in harmony with
our stable moral convictions. It is with this ideal state in mind
that Rawls undertakes in the middle chapters to detail the
implications of justice as fairness.
A relevant argument against a conception of justice would
be that humans cannot be expected to act on its principles even
if they endorse them and intend to act on them. Such a
conception would not be feasible, however admirable from an
ideal standpoint. To deal with this question, Rawls introduces
the notion of a well-ordered society in which "everyone accepts
and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice,
and the basic social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy
these principles" (454). He argues by appeal to moral
psychology that a well-ordered society in which the principles
of justice as fairness are accepted would tend to generate a sense
of justice that would normally win out against propensities
toward injustice. He argues further that in such a society a
person's conception of his own good will support and affirm his
sense of justice. In this way justice is said to be congruent with
goodness. The idea here is clearly not that justice and egoism go
hand and hand, as if justice placed no limitation on the pursuit
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of one's own ends. It is rather that justice as fairness is
compatible with, and in part makes possible, the realization of
one's own good.
The most important alternative conception of justice is
utilitarianism. Deliberately ignoring recent refinements in its
formulation, Rawls takes the classical doctrine, as found in
Adam Smith, Bentham, and Sidgewick, to imply that "society is
rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions
are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of
satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it"
(22). The refinements are thought to obscure its fundamental
divergence from justice as fairness. The latter is more likely to
generate a strong sense of justice, partly because it is more
congruent with our good and partly because of the greater
clarity of its principles. Clarity suffers even in refined
utilitarianism because the complexity of the calculations
involved in applying the doctrine make it difficult to know its
real implications. Unless an adequate understanding of inter-
personal utility comparisons is made out (so far none is at
hand), even the theoretical possibility of accurate calculations is
in doubt. For these reasons too it will be difficult to have a
well-ordered society where basic institutions are known to
satisfy the utilitarian principle and persons can be counted on
to fulfill their duties.
But Rawls' main objection to utilitarianism is that it allows
the interests of some to be sacrificed to maximize the net
balance of satisfactions. This injustice is compatible with
Bentham's formula "everybody to count for one, nobody for
more than one", since the formula implies only that no person's
satisfactions should be given a special weight. The result is that
some persons are treated as means only, and not as ends in
themselves in the Kantian sense. Rawls considers the example
(450) where the larger part of society has an abhorrence for
certain religious or sexual practices. Suppose that the thought
that these things are going on is enough to arouse the majority
to extreme anger and hatred, even though no social injury has
been done. In this situation the principle of utility can justify
repressive measures which Rawls believes would not accord with
our considered moral judgments. Similar examples are easy to
produce; they appear to show that utilitarianism is not a
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conception of justice in reflective equilibrium with our most
stable moral convictions.
I shall now try to place this attack in perspective by
considering the relation between the theories of right and good
in justice as fairness.
III
Rawls is fully aware that to account for the primary goods
without circularity he must develop a "thin" theory of
goodness in which principles of right are not presupposed. For
ethical principles about how institutions ought to be structured
and how individuals ought to act - what Rawls calls principles
of right - are to be established by assuming that each party in
the original position is motivated to maximize his share of the
primary goods. If the primary goods themselves are determined
at least in part by an appeal to principles of right, Rawls would
be moving in a vicious circle. A thin theory of goodness, which
does not presuppose such principles, is needed therefore to
account for the primary goods. Once accounted for, however,
they may be used to arrive at principles of right, and these in
turn may be employed, as in the last chapters, to construct a
"full" theory of goodness to explain the moral virtues, the
moral worth of persons, and related concepts. A thin theory is
similarly required to argue for the "congruence" of justice and
goodness. For if this argument is to be significant, it must do
more than show that a sense of justice, defined by principles of
right, is desirable from the standpoint of human values in which
a sense of justice is already imbedded.
The price of avoiding circularity by the use of two theories
of goodness is that the deontological character of justice as
fairness is seriously weakened. Rawls defines a deontological
(non-teleological) theory as one that "either does not specify
the good independently from the right, or does not interpret
the right as maximizing the good" (30). Justice as fairness, in
contrast with classical utilitarianism, may appear to be
deontological in both ways. As regards the first, Rawls
maintains that "in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior
to that of the good" (31, 396). This means:
The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on
which satisfactions have value; they impose restric-
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tions on what are reasonable conceptions of one's
good.. .the interests requiring the violation of justice
have no value. Having no merit in the first place, they
cannot override its claims. (31)
Thus an "individual who finds that he enjoys seeing others in
positions of lesser liberty understands he has no claim whatever
to this enjoyment. The pleasure he takes in other's [sic]
deprivations is wrong in itself" (31). By contrast, in "utilitari-
anism the satisfaction of any desire has some value which must
be taken into account in deciding what is right... We are to
arrange institutions so as to obtain the greatest sum of
satisfactions; we ask no questions about their source or
quality..." (30).
Clearly there is a problem here. It is only with respect to
concepts and implications peculiar to the full theory of
goodness that the concept of right is prior to that of the good.
In the thin theory, which is to account for the primary goods,
the concept of right cannot be prior on pain of circularity.
Hence, when Rawls says that "the interests requiring the
violation of justice have no value" we must interpret this to
mean that such interests have no value in the full theory of
goodness, although they may have value in the thin theory. But
then justice as fairness is no more deontological than
utilitarianism with respect to the priority of right. In both, a
theory of goodness is developed independently of the concept
of right, and principles of right are formulated in terms of this
prior theory of goodness. Moreover, once these principles are at
hand either theory may be used to argue that certain desires are
wrong and that others ought to be developed instead. The
utilitarian could argue, for example, that the desire to
discriminate against another is wrong because it will tend to
diminish the total net balance of satisfactions that is otherwise
possible. Apparently, the only significant difference is that in
justice as fairness a desire can be wrong in itself if its object is
wrong according to a principle of right, whereas in utilitarianism
a desire can be wrong only in view of the consequences of
having it in a given situation. But this difference reflects the
difference in the principles of right; it does not show that the
principles of right somehow have a greater priority in justice as
fairness.
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The second way in which justice as fairness appears to be
deontological is that the right is not interpreted as maximizing
the good in the way that utilitarianism interprets it. For in
justice as fairness the main principles explicitly preclude
sacrificing the interests of one party to maximize the net
balance of satisfactions on the whole. Notice, however, that the
parties in the original position are to agree upon principles that
maximize (with minimum risk) their individual shares of the
primary goods. So justice as fairness cannot be claimed to be
deontological on the ground that it is not in any sense a
maximizing theory. What can be said is that in justice as fairness
the maximizing character of the principles of right is limited by
qualifications that are built into the formulation of the
principles and that there are no parallel qualifications in
classical utilitarianism. The fact that these qualifications are
explicit in its principles of right makes justice as fairness more
deontological in this respect than utilitarianism.
But now it must be asked whether this is a substantive
difference: Is there a difference in the practical implications of
the two theories for the structure of institutions and the
conduct of individuals? This question cannot be answered
without assuming some theory of goodness. Since utilitarianism
as such is not tied to any one theory of goodness, suppose that
it is formulated in terms of Rawls' thin theory. If, given this
common theory of goodness and true empirical generalizations,
the substantive implications of utilitarianism are even close to
those of justice as fairness, then this "deontological" theory
does not provide the kind of substantive alternative to
utilitarianism that Rawls wants.
I shall not argue that Rawls has failed to construct such an
alternative. I am not sure he has. But I shall discuss some
important ways in which his account of justice as fairness leaves
the issue unsettled. (1) It is not at all clear that a definite set of
primary goods, much less the ones Rawls lists, can be derived
from the thin theory of goodness. (2) Once derived, they may
be used in utilitarianism to overcome some of Rawls' objections
to utilitarianism regarding the possibility of interpersonal utility
comparisons. (3) Given a plausible extension of Rawls' set of
primary goods, each party in the original position could
rationally choose utilitarian principles without fear that his own
interests would be sacrificed on some occasions to benefit the
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majority. To defend these points it is necessary to consider how
the primary goods are supposed to be established within the
thin theory.
IV
The primary goods are "things that every rational man is
presumed to want" and "normally have use whatever a person's
rational plan of life" (62). "They are things which it is supposed
a rational man wants whatever else he wants. Regardless of what
an individual's rational plans are in detail, it is assumed that
there are various things which he would prefer more of rather
than less" (92). "[Rlational plans ... all require for their
execution certain primary goods... whatever one's system of
ends, primary goods are the necessary means" (93). (See also
174, 410-11.) But what is a rational plan of life? A person's
plan of life or system of ends describes in a general way that he
intends to do in his life. Although it is not a detailed blueprint
for action stretching over the whole course of life, it
"establishes the basic point of view from which all judgments of
value relating to a particular person are to be made" (409). A
rational plan is defined by two conditions:
(1) It is one of the plans that is consistent with the
principles of rational choice when these are applied to
all the relevant features of his situation, and (2) it is
that plan among those meeting this condition which
would be chosen by him with full deliberative
rationality, that is, with full awareness of the relevant
facts and after a careful consideration of the
consequences. (408)
The three relatively uncontroversial principles of rational
choice which Rawls defines turn out not to be always sufficient
to rank all the plans open to a given person (415), but when
deliberative rationality is applied exactly one plan is understood
to be selected as "the objectively rational plan" for the
individual and this plan determines the individual's "real good"
(417). Rawls tells us that we can think of a person as being
happy (with certain qualifications) "when he is in the way of a
successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life
drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is
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reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through"
(409).
The primary goods are the necessary means to the
execution of anyone's rational plan of life in which lies his good
- indeed, his happiness. But does anyone know what his
rational plan is? Rawls concedes: "Often we do not know what
is the rational plan for us; the most that we can have is a
reasonable belief as to where our good lies, and sometimes we
can only conjecture" (417). Rawls is too optimistic. To know
one's rational plan requires exercising one's "full deliberative
rationality" and this demands perfect information about all the
relevant consequences of all the various courses of conduct
open to one (417). Furthermore, one can be under no
misconceptions as to what one really wants or will want, so that
when one achieves one's aim, there will never be any regret
about the course taken (417, 421). It is plain, I think, that no
person has reasonable beliefs about the nature of his rational
plan of life as long as this is, by definition, the plan a person
would choose with full deliberative rationality. But if this is so,
it is hard to see how one could ascertain which goods are
necessary for the success of any rational plan.
Here it will be objected that some goods, such as food and
shelter, necessary to sustain life itself, can be known to be
necessary for the success of any plan of life, even when nothing
is known about the content of these plans. This is true. But an
adequate theory of how institutions ought to be structured and
how individuals ought to act must do more than guarantee a fair
share of such basic goods. Presumably the parties in the original
position are motivated to maximize their share of the primary
goods not merely because they desire to live, but because they
want to be in a position to realize their conceptions of a good
life. The primary goods should include, therefore, all the goods
which are necessary for executing any rational plan.
The difficulty of deriving a definite set of primary goods is
complicated by two further considerations. First, happiness in
life is impossible unless one enjoys at least some of one's
activities.t But it is not clear that a rational plan of life, as
Rawls defines it, need include any enjoyment at all. It is
therefore unclear whether the primary goods necessary for
rational plans are those necessary for happy lives. Second,
which goods are necessary for either one will depend partly on
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what institutions are assumed to exist already. Only very
limited individual income and wealth, for example, may be
necessary for happiness within some possible social and
economic structures. But Rawls is in danger of arguing in a
circle if he first assumes the existence of certain kinds of
institutions to determine the primary goods and then uses the
latter to determine what kinds of institutions ought to exist. If,
on the other hand, no institutions are assumed to exist,
reasonable beliefs about rational plans of life become even more
difficult. For one must try to imagine what one's desires and
needs would be apart from any social or economic context.
It is noteworthy that Rawls presents no argument to show
that his list, or indeed any list, of primary goods can be derived
within the thin theory of goodness. He apparently regards the
derivation as evident to common sense (434). In any case, there
is the following dilemma. Either some set of primary goods can
be derived or not. If not, the two main principles, presupposing
a definite set of primary goods, must be replaced, presumably
by a more general principle by which all social goods are to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all,
of these goods is to everyone's advantage (62). The social goods,
as opposed to the natural ones, will be those interests and aims
which are encouraged by each rational life plan and controlled
by the basic structure of society. But it is entirely unclear, of
course, what the practical implications of such a principle
would be compared with those of utilitarianism formulated
with respect to the same interests and aims. This is unclear not
only because we do not know what these interests and aims are
(apart from the bare necessities of life), but also because the
determination of an equal distribution, not to say a comparison
of the advantages of an equal with an unequal distribution,
requires the sort of interpersonal utility comparisons that are so
troublesome for the utilitarian.
If, to take the other horn, we assume that some set of
primary goods can be derived, it is open to the utilitarian to
interpret his first principle of right as maximizing these goods.
He thus avoids many of the problems of interpersonal utility
comparisons. Such comparisons would not be eliminated
altogether in either theory. Utilitarianism, moreover, lacks the
advantage of the Difference Principle. For once the representa-
tive least-advantaged man is located, application of this
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principle requires only ordinal comparisons among combina-
tions of primary goods. Still, a substantial difficulty in the way
of an adequate understanding of the implications of utilitari-
anism would be reduced if a complete set of primary goods
could be determined.
It might be thought, however, that given almost any set of
primary goods and a method of comparing them, the
distributions dictated by utilitarianism are bound to be unfair in
many cases. For in maximizing the total (or average share) of
primary goods possessed by everyone, the interests of some
persons would be sacrificed unfairly to benefit the majority. Let
us suppose with Rawls that the chief social primary goods are
self-respect, rights and liberties, powers and opportunities,
income and wealth. Self-respect occupies a central place among
these goods (62, 67, 178ff, 440ff). Rawls says: "It is clearly
rational for men to secure their self-respect. A sense of their
own worth is necessary if they are to pursue their conception of
the good with zest and to delight in its fulfillment" (178).
Rawls believes that the public recognition of utilitarianism
entails some loss of self-esteem (181). But he also says that
"those who respect themselves are more likely to respect each
other and conversely. Self-contempt leads to contempt of
others and threatens their good as much as envy does" (179).
The latter is surely plausible at the level of common-sense
empiricism and suggests that respect for others, especially an
appreciation of their worth as equal to one's own, is also a
primary good. Indeed, respect for and appreciation of others
must be a primary good if we can assume that rational plans will
include some form of social cooperation among individuals who
recognize their needs as equally worthy of fulfillment. Now it
must be asked whether maximizing the total (or average) of
primary goods will lead to sacrifices by minorities. It is not
obvious that it would, especially if respect for others is given
priority in utility comparisons. For unfair distributions, at least
in a well-ordered society, will automatically prevent the
advantaged from sharing this primary good, and probably the
disadvantaged too.
V
Should there be little difference in the practical import of
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utilitarianism and justice as fairness it would not follow from
this alone that utilitarianism is an adequate theory or that
justice as fairness is not. What would be true is that Rawls has
definitely misconceived the nature of justice as fairness, but I
have not argued for this conclusion either. Instead I have
expressed reservations about the supposed opposition between
the theories. This issue cannot be settled, it appears, until the
underlying theories of goodness are clarified. Only then will the
actual implications of utilitarianism be clear enough for us to
make a choice, if there is one to be made.
Richmond Campbell,
Department of Philosophy,
Dalhousie University.

